EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Uzbekistan: Moscow Giving Tashkent the Silent Treatment

EURASIA INSIGHT

UZBEKISTAN: MOSCOW GIVING TASHKENT THE SILENT TREATMENT
Sergei Blagov 11/17/08

Russian leaders publicly have downplayed the significance of Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the Eurasian Economic Community. Yet, experts in Moscow say that Tashkent’s action delivered a considerable blow to the Kremlin’s strategic economic plans in Central Asia.

The news that Tashkent was opting out of the economic grouping came on November 12. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Tashkent did not immediately offer an explanation for its decision. But subsequently a letter penned by President Islam Karimov came to light in which the Uzbek leader voiced strong displeasure with the group’s operations, complaining of "duplication and overlap" with other regional groups, in particular the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Russia’s immediate response to the Uzbek move was feigned indifference. No high-ranking Russian official offered public comment on Uzbekistan’s withdrawal. Indeed, the Kremlin reaction was limited to remarks by an unnamed Foreign Ministry source, quoted in a report distributed by the official RIA Novosti news agency. "This [the withdrawal] is the sovereign right of any member state," the Foreign Ministry force said, going on to hint that Tashkent acted in a fit of pique because it could not gain admission on favorable terms to a customs union involving Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia.

Uzbekistan apparently made its intentions known in October, but EEC representatives waited nearly a month to make the news public.

While the Kremlin may not be showing any outward signs of concern or displeasure, some political analysts said Tashkent’s decision nevertheless caused consternation inside Moscow’s Ring Road.

A few Russian observers noted that Tashkent seems increasingly skeptical over the benefits of membership in post-Soviet groupings. If the skeptical mood among Uzbek leaders continues to deepen, Uzbekistan could possibly opt to withdraw from the CSTO, and even the SCO. "Karimov is now going to watch closely how Russia will react. Depending on this, he will decide whether to stay on as a CSTO member or withdraw," the Interfax news agency quoted Konstantin Zatulin, head of the Moscow-based Institute of CIS Countries, as saying.

Over the near term, Tashkent’s decision could greatly complicate Russia’s efforts to cement its gains in the Caspian Basin energy development contest. Specifically, tension in Uzbek-Russian relations adds to the uncertainty of a project that aims to expand Russian-controlled pipeline networks in Central Asia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The planned expansion of the so-called Prikaspiisky route is already way behind schedule. Now, experts are asking whether the plan will ever become reality, especially given the drastic fall in energy prices of late.

The roots of Uzbek dissatisfaction may lie in unfulfilled Russian promises in the security sphere. In the wake of the 2005 Andijan events, the US-Uzbek strategic partnership fell apart, prompting Tashkent to search for a new security partner. Russia at the time seemed eager to meet Tashkent’s needs. In November 2005, Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Karimov signed a strategic alliance treaty. And it was only last January that, following a Kremlin meeting with Karimov, Putin described Uzbek-Russian ties as having the "quality of an alliance."

From Tashkent’s standpoint, however, Russia has been slow to back up all its "strategic alliance" rhetoric with any meaningful political or economic gestures towards Uzbekistan. For example, Russia’s major energy companies have repeatedly announced plans for major investment projects in Uzbekistan, but implementation has been slow. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Paradoxically, EEC membership appeared to benefit Uzbekistan economically. Tashkent joined the group in 2006, and Uzbek trade with other EEC states reached $5.7 billion the following year, marking a 44 percent year-on-year increase. That figure included a robust $1.2 billion trade surplus within the EEC. Trade with Russia represents more than 70 percent of Uzbek commerce with the EEC.

Some Russian experts suggest Tashkent’s actions are linked to broader changes in Central Asia’s geopolitical environment. Specifically, the United States and European Union have made a strong effort in recent months to restore ties with Uzbekistan. A commentary published November 12 in the Russian daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta hinted that the Uzbek withdrawal from the EEC was Tashkent’s way of making a reciprocal gesture of friendship to the United States. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

"With this decision Uzbekistan makes it clear that it wants to be friends with the West, and not appear to be as pro-Russian as the West believed it to be," echoed Zatulin.

Other analysts suggested that Karimov’s political maneuvering could come back to hurt him. It is too early to say whether Uzbekistan’s formerly close relationship with the United States can be fully restored, especially since a new US presidential administration will be coming to power in January. It is likewise uncertain, given recent developments, how much support the Kremlin is willing to give the Karimov administration. Given the prevailing economic uncertainty around the globe, Karimov could find himself in a situation in which he faces a serious expression of popular discontent without being able to count on the firm support of either Washington or Moscow.

In this respect, the Kremlin’s silence concerning the Uzbek withdrawal from the EEC can be seen as an unsettling development for Karimov. Moscow, it seems, has yet to work out how it intends to respond. Given the potential economic impact of the move, few Western experts believe Russia will simply shrug off the episode and move on.

Editor's Note: Sergei Blagov is a Moscow-based specialist in CIS political affairs.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

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