EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Uzbekistan: Putin Visit Hopes to Arrest Russia's Diplomatic Slide in Central Asia

EURASIA INSIGHT

UZBEKISTAN: PUTIN VISIT HOPES TO ARREST RUSSIA’S DIPLOMATIC SLIDE IN CENTRAL ASIA
8/29/08

After experiencing an embarrassing denouement at the Dushanbe summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Russia seems increasingly concerned about the possibility of diplomatic encirclement. Russia’s political supremo, Vladimir Putin, will try to prevent Russia’s further diplomatic slippage when makes an early September visit to Tashkent, where he will try to dissuade Uzbek leaders from pursuing closer ties with the United States.

Putin is scheduled to be in Tashkent on September 1-2. It can be hardly reassuring to the Kremlin that just four days before Putin’s arrival, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, the acting commander of the US Central Command, was in Tashkent for meetings with top Uzbek officials. A US Embassy statement downplayed the visit as "regular consultations." Meanwhile, the visit was not publicized in advance, and received scant attention from the Uzbek press. The lack of publicity, though, doesn’t mean that Dempsey’s visit was a mere courtesy call. A January visit to Uzbekistan by Dempsey’s predecessor, Adm. William Fallon, was widely credited with opening the way for a US-Uzbek rapprochement. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The Putin trip takes on an added sense of urgency in the wake of the SCO’s decision not to offer Russia a full endorsement for the Kremlin’s incursion into Georgia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The outcome of the Dushanbe summit on August 28, which took place the same day Dempsey was in Tashkent, indicates that China wields greater influence among the organization’s Central Asian members than does Russia. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Russia, it would seem, needs to shore up its political standing in Central Asia.

Uzbek President Islam Karimov was in Dushanbe for the SCO summit and reportedly did not meet with Dempsey. Dempsey is said to have consulted with Uzbek Minister of Defense, Ruslan Mirzayev, his deputy, Rustam Niyazov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ilkhom Nematov, as well as officials from the State Commission of Drug Control. The talks examined "a broad range of issues, including regional security, reconstruction in Afghanistan, human rights, and counter-narcotics efforts," according to the statement.

Local analysts believe the visit was strategically significant. "It can mean that strategic issues were settled beforehand, and Dempsey did not need to meet with Karimov; it was sufficient to meet with lower-ranking officials to discuss the tactical details," says a Tashkent-based analyst, speaking about Karimov’s absence from Tashkent. "It can also mean that Karimov did not want to anger Moscow by meeting with top US military official ahead of Putin’s visit."

Putin will try to breathe some life into the diplomatic doldrums in which Uzbek-Russian relations now find themselves. In the wake of the 2005 Andijan events, Tashkent and Moscow expanded security and economic ties, but the relationship has stalled over the past year. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Several Russian diplomatic and trade delegations have returned from Tashkent largely empty-handed in 2008. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Highlighting the tension creeping into the bilateral relationship, Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian state that President Dmitry Medvedev, Putin’s executive surrogate, has not yet visited or has scheduled a visit.

At the same time Uzbek-Russian relations have stalled, Washington has pressed a diplomatic offensive, appointing a new ambassador who has overseen the resumption of contacts that were broken amid the fallout over Andijan.

Prior to Russia’s setback at the SCO summit, Russian officials billed Putin’s visit as one that would be economically oriented. Putin is expected to discuss with his Uzbek hosts issues such as the volume and price of Uzbek natural gas purchase by the Russian behemoth Gazprom, the Kremlin’s key money-making machine, as well as the construction of a liquefied gas production facility at the Mubarek gas field by another Russian company, Stroytransgas. The latter project, along with several others by major Russian businesses, is being held up by Uzbek authorities, who are concerned about Russian influence over Uzbekistan’s economy. Nevertheless, Putin will also discuss further Russian investments in the Uzbek energy sector, in particular, participation in the privatization of the Syrdarya thermal power plant.

Other negotiation areas include transportation and communication, where Russian companies are also heavily represented. For instance, Uzbekistan’s two leading mobile companies belong to Russian businesses.

Meanwhile, Uzbek leaders want to discuss the issue of Uzbek labor migrants in Russia. Uzbek expatriates send home billions of dollars annually, supporting the economy and easing the political pressure created by widespread poverty. Russia is Uzbekistan’s key trade partner, involving just under 30 percent of Uzbekistan’s foreign trade. Despite the new chill in relations, Tashkent is not interested in seeing relations turn frosty.

Tashkent-based analysts are generally skeptical that Putin’s visit will succeed in improving the current state of Uzbek-Russian affairs. "Why would Karimov take a side at this point? Russia is in a vulnerable position, i.e. open for all sorts of compromises; the US wants to improve its positions in Central Asia too. It is much more beneficial [for Karimov] to wait, to keep both sides hanging and thinking what else to offer Tashkent," said the Tashkent analyst, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

"Uzbekistan, yet again, stands to gain the most from the US-Russian competition," the analyst added.

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